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current system to effectively address this ongoing organ
deficiency underscores the need for change at the state and
federal level.
In response, this paper argues for a departure from
the current opt-in system and the theoretical, subsequent
adoption of opt-out and priority allocation system.

Organ Shortage as a Public Health Issue
Transplantation as a Solution to Organ Failure

While the need for transplantable organs can be
traced back to antiquity, it was not until the twentieth century that advancements in modern medicine have been
able overcome the technical limitations that previously
prevented it from becoming the routine practice it is today
(Starzl, 1994). Early twentieth century attempts at renal
xenotransplantation between human recipients and mammalian donors (i.e., sheep, pigs, goats, and of transplanted
organs. It was not until 1944 when Peter Medawar demonstrated that rejection of transplanted organs is an immunologic process in itself. die each day waiting for a donation
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2019).
Despite increased public awareness campaigns and other
attempts to promote donor registration, the gap between
supply and demand continues to widen as the number of
Presumed Consent and Priority Allocation Systems for Organ Donation Legislation
patients on waiting lists has continued to climb over last
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Medawar’s work focused on the rejection of
skin grafts, using rabbits and cattle to investigate the
process. His research identified immune responses via
lymphocyte infiltration of genetically different grafts
as being responsible for organ rejection and found that
an exchange of skin grafts between monozygotic, as
well as dizygotic, pairs retained their test twin grafts
with little to no indications of rejection, while still
demonstrating rejection of grafts from unrelated third
party donors (Anderson et. al, 1951). In a bold application of Medawar’s work, a team led by physicians Joseph Murray, John Harrison, and John Merrill performed the first long-term successful kidney transplant between identical twins in 1954 (Merril et. al,
1956). Their landmark success paved the way for the
development of increasingly better methods of histocompatibility matching, organ procurement and
preservation, and numerous innovations in surgical
techniques. Such efforts ultimately made it possible to
successfully engraft all of the major organs and bone
marrow cells in humans.
Organ Shortage as a Public Health Issue
Since 1995, over 161,000 patients registered on
waiting list have died before an organ became available in the U.S. (OPTN, 2019). More recent statistics
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported that as of January 2019, over 113,000
Americans were registered on the national transplant
waiting list and roughly 20 of those patients die each
day waiting for a donation (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 2019). The increasing demand
for transplantable organs compounded with the nationwide deficit of registered donor has deprived
thousands of American patients of a new and better
quality of life. Despite campaign efforts and other attempts to promote donor registration, the gap between
supply and demand continues to widen.

Global Strategies to Address Transplantable
Organ Shortages
Global Strategies
Organ scarcity is not unique to the United
States; it is a pervasive challenge that all medically advanced countries face. In recent decades, global political strategies have taken steps to address the shortage
by changing two components of transplantation legislation: presumed consent and allocation priority. The
implementation of these two systems operate effectively by changing the status quo of organ donation
and giving registered donors priority among the pool
of individuals in need of organ transplantation. The
joint implementation of these two systems has yielded
beneficial effects in countries such as Israel and Singapore. Proving national and international efforts are effective in facilitating change when they are supported
by regional and global action within agreed policy
frames.
Explicit opt-out laws have long been among the
major interventions used to increase the pool of potential donors in countries such as Austria, Belgium, the

Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden and Turkey. There is evidence that
supports the association between presumed consent
and increased donation rates and that countries with
opt-out laws have rates 25 to 50% higher than those in
countries requiring explicit consent (Abadie & Gay,
2006). One study found that the rates of deceased donor rates (per-million population) were 42.7% higher
in opt-out countries. However, the study revealed a
paradox in which the opt-in countries reported 70.5%
higher rates of living donors compared to opt-out
countries (Abadie & Gay, 2006). Hence, presumed
consent appears to be only one of several influential
factors. Other factors include potential donor availability, transplantation infrastructure, health care spending and public attitude towards donation (Rithalia et.
al, 2009), as well as an agreement of the next-of-kin
and donor registry infrastructure (Bilgel, 2012).
In 1987, Singapore introduced the Human Organ Transplant Act, which instituted an opt-out system that presumed consent to removal of organs for
transplantation upon death and apply priority
allocation. Under priority allocation systems, those
who object and withdraw their consent to donate upon their death also forfeit a priority stop on the national transplantation waiting list, should they require
a transplantation in future. The combined system not
only changed the status quo of donation but provided
an incentive for donation: receiving priority on the
waiting list (Breyer & Kliemt, 2007). A concern with
combining the opt-out and priority allocation system
is that the priority rule cannot prevent the free-rider
problem if the introduction of an opt-out system has
already generated a sufficient organ supply. Overall,
Singapore’s combination of presumed consent and
priority status has been successful in increasing organ
donations.
Following suit, the Organ Transplant Act came
into effect in Israel in 2010. The new law introduced a
priority point system to motivate individuals to donate their organs by granting prioritization in organ
allocation to candidates who have either been registered as organ donors for at least three years prior to
transplantation request, or have given explicit consent
for organ donation of their deceased next-of-kin
(Lavee et. al, 2010). Israel’s system also rewards those
who are willing to act as living donors for kidney or
liver donation with a preferential status as a recipient.
A person can also gain priority points by signing a
donor card, making a non-directed/non-specified organ donation during their lifetime, or being a firstdegree relative signing a donor card or consenting to
procurement of organs after death. The resulting
tiered system includes maximum priority, regular priority and second priority. Maximum priority is granted to candidates if: (i) consent has been given for organ donation from a deceased first-degree relative or
(ii) they donated a kidney, a lobe of their liver or a
lobe of their lungs in the course of their life to a nonspecified recipient. Regular priority is given to candidates who hold a donor card, that is, those who have
consented to donate their organs after their death. Second priority is granted to candidates with a firstdegree relative who holds a donor card, even if they
do not hold a donor card themselves. As a result, the
act has led to a record number of signed donor cards
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and, ultimately, a significant increase in the numbers
of transplants (Cronin, 2014)
The Spanish Model
In 2016, Spain boasted an impressive number of
deceased donors at 43.4 per million population (pmp),
an increase from 39.7 pmp in 2015 and 36 pmp in 2014.
The 2016 Spanish rates are much higher than the EU
average (19.6 pmp) and the U.S. average (26.6 pmp).
Having the world’s highest rates of donation per capita, Spain has become the world leader in organ transplants. In 1979, Spain instituted its opt-out system
through the implementation of presumed-consent legislation and since then, has required all prospective
donors to be declared dead on neurological criteria by
a minimum of three physicians (Gundle, 2005). Once
death has been declared, any individual who has not
formally registered an opposition is considered a potential donor and the process of organ procurement
begins. This system, combined with an ingrained societal respect for organ donors, has contributed to
Spain's successful organ procurement program.
The Spanish model for opt-out donor registration offers simple and practical principles to guide the
development and implementation of policies at both
the national and state levels. Taken together, these
principles reflect the multifaceted determinants of organ transplantation and the coordinated multi-sectoral
action required to implement effective legislation.

The Case Against Opt-Out Organ Donation
Legislation
Libertarianism and Organ Donation: Loss of Autonomy
The primary points of contention within the default debate are between opt-in and opt-out statutes,
founded in the interpretation and adherence to the autonomy of the donor under the assertions of the Libertarian model. Those in objection to the presumed consent model assert that such systems place limitations
on and unjustly reduce patient autonomy. According
to this view, it is wrong to invade and assume possession of someone’s body without that person’s consent
(Gill, 2004), and that the government is already too involved in the lives of its citizens. Such claims are
founded upon the principles set out under libertarianism, a political ideology that places emphasis on safeguarding individual liberties and minimizing government involvement in the affairs of its citizens. One
of the fundamental assumptions of libertarianism is
the right to self- ownership; libertarianism asserts the
full right to control the use of one’s own person and
the need for explicit consent without external influence or coercion (Vallentyne, 2008). Proponents of this
ideology would argue that presumed consent laws
further invade the affairs of the governed by assuming
possession over their body, and thus violating their
right to self-ownership.
An Imperfect Solution
While it is evident that opt-out systems are successful in increasing rates of registered organ donors,

it is important to note that it is not failsafe solution.
Even in opt-out countries such as Spain and France, a
near 100% registration rate does not translate into surplus of organs, a fact often overlooked when advocating for opt-out systems. Even in countries with presumed consent, there is still a waiting list for organs.
This can be attributed to the fact that majority of registered donors do not die in ways or conditions suitable
for organ donation. In fact, only approximately 3 out
of every 1000 deaths occur in a way that allows for organ donation (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2019). While the institution of opt-out systems increases the rates of registered donors, the death
of an organ donor does not guarantee an organ donation.

The Case in Favor of Opt-Out Organ Donation
Legislation
Utilitarianism and Organ Donation: Increase Autonomy
On the other side of the argument are those
who believe the United States should adopt a system
of presumed consent for organ procurement. They respond to the argument over a loss of autonomy by
countering that a presumed consent model actually
provides more autonomy than expressed consent because it allows the donor, not his or her family members, to make the final decision. They maintain that
asking a family for a loved one's organs at a time of intense grief is cruel and unnecessary and that, by presuming consent, the family's conflict over this decision
is avoided. Furthermore, there are those who argue
that the burden of communicating and registering
preference should fall on those who object to donating,
not those who support it, because the goal of
transplantation is one that must be widely accepted by
the public. Communicating objection rather than acceptance would also increase accuracy, asserting that
objectors are more likely to register their opposition
than supporters are to sign up as donors. Anecdotally
speaking, people are more inclined to write bad reviews than they are good ones; more inclined to express opposition than approval. Following this argument, there would be fewer mistakes in interpreting a
potential donor's wishes. To conclude this line of reasoning, Gill (2004) suggests that all mistakes in interpreting a donor's preferences have the same moral
worth; it is no worse, Gill says, to assume that someone wants to donate, take his or her organs, and then
find out that he or she objected than to wrongly assume that someone did not wish to donate and therefore forgo potential organs.
Moreover, survey data indicates a significant
disagreement between preferences for donation and
donor card registrations. In particular, results from a
well-known survey (Gallup, 1993) indicate that
while most Americans favor organ donation (89%)
and would like to donate their organs after death
(69%), only a few grant permissions for postmortem
organ procurement on their driver’s license or organ
donor card (28%).
Ultimately, supporters of presumed consent
law also employ a utilitarian argument as support for
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implementing such a policy that claims that presumed
consent provides the greatest good for the greatest
number of people by harming no one and benefiting
many. This paper argues that there is a proportionate
moral case in favor for the implementation of presumed consent legislation within the United States.
From a utilitarian perspective, it represents the routine
disposal of a highly valuable commodity, one which
has the potential to save lives.
Potential Economic Impact of Organ Donation
The economic toll of organ impairment and
dysfunction place an immense strain on healthcare infrastructures. In 2014, more was spent by Medicare on
chronic renal disease treatment, such as dialysis, than
all cancer treatments combined, despite cancer claiming nearly 12 times as many lives as chronic renal disease. (Liyanage et al, 2015). On a national level, the
United States Ultimately, the burden of cost of endstage organ disease is a global economic crisis, with
over $1 trillion spent over a decade on chronic renal
disease alone (Liyanage et al, 2015).
In recent years, the question of how many
defaults influence economic choice has become an issue of great interest amongst legislators, in part because it is believed that organic default systems can
reduce the burden place by chronic disease on both
the individual and healthcare infrastructures. As a
model, the presumed-consent policy in Spain is costeffective, saving the National Health Service more
than 200,000 Euros in medical costs for each kidney
transplant preformed on a patient on dialysis (LopezNavidad & Caballero, 2001).

Corrective Vision: A Model for Legislation
Consideration
This section briefly sketches a plausible model
for organ donation in the U.S. Although simple, the
model takes into consideration three components of
transplantation legislation implemented globally and
their effect in addressing the organ shortage crisis: (1)
the implementation of presumed consent policies; (2)
the implementation of allocation priority systems for
registered organ donors (3) educational programs for
hospitals, ICU staff, coordinators, and the general public.
Implementing Presumed Consent Policies
According to the concept of presumed consent,
anyone can be an organ donor after his or her death
unless the individual had documented objection during his or her lifetime and permission of family members is not required. In countries that have accepted
the concept of presumed consent, such as Spain, there
is the highest number of organs from deceased donors.
Reciprocal Allocation of Organs
Universal donor systems place no special conditions on the relationship between donor status and
transplant allocation, whereas contingent entitlement
systems mandate reciprocity by giving consenting pot-

Educational Programs
One of the greatest barriers to increasing the
rates of organ donation is the lack of education and
misconceptions of organ donation by the public. Within the past decade, Donor Action Programs have been
carried out across Europe in the form of public education programs via broadcast and print media, schools,
universities, and public awareness campaigns. This, in
conjunction with training programs for hospitals and
ICU staff, have resulted in a 53% increase in organ donation (Tuppin & Savoye, 2006).
In the U.S., with support from the Department
of Health and Human Services and the Health Resources and Services Administration, the Program of
Organ Donation Break- Through involving collaboration between the transplant community and the general public was established in 2003 (Abouna, 2008) As
a result, the number of organs from deceased donors
increased by 8% per year (Punch et. al, 2007). It has also been recommended by the United Network for Organ Sharing that general physicians should educate
their patients about organ donation (United Network
for Organ Sharing, 2007). Raising awareness has
shown to increase the rates of organ donor registration
by creating a better public understanding of the process and generating better public attitudes towards
donation.

Conclusion
The current protocol for organ procurement
and allocation in the U.S. operates under the guidelines set out by an opt-in system. The inability of the
current system to effectively address this ongoing organ deficiency underscores the moral need for change
at the state and federal level. In response, this paper
has argued for a departure from the current opt-in system and the ethical justification of a theoretical, subsequent adoption of opt-out and priority allocation system.
While it seems unlikely that the United States
will make the transition to a system of presumed consent for organ procurement in the near future, the ethical impetus of transitioning to an opt-out system remains a priority in American medicine today, along
with the autonomous right of the competent patient to
make all of his or her own medical decisions. Based on
the proportion of people who report being willing to
donate their organs and those who actually register to
do so, the organ shortage problem stems in large part
from a moral failure to obtain permission to recover
organs. This critical problem requires education, action, and a national conversation about human agency
versus human life.
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